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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION-STATEMENT
OF LACK OF JURISDICTION AS QUALIFYING PERMISSIE ORDER OF COMMISSION.-
A novel situation arose in the case of Southern Railway Company v.
State,1 recently decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The defendant
railway company, an interstate carrier running through Georgia, had
purchased a short line located wholly within and chartered by the state of
Georgia. Thereafter the latter road became a branch line of and was op-
erated by the Southern Railway Company as a part of its system in both
intrastate and interstate traffic. Subsequently the Southern filed an appli-
cation with the Interstate Commerce Commission seeking a certificate of
public necessity and convenience authorizing it to abandon a portion of
the newly-acquired road. At the hearing of the commission the state of
Georgia, its public service commission, and several private citizens, hav-
ing been duly notified, appeared and protested against the proposed
abandonment. They objected that for the defendant to abandon part of the
road and at the same time retain its franchise as to the remainder is a
violation of the state law, i.e., the charter contract. Following a test
1 4 S.E. (2d) 233 (1939).
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period of one year as ordered by the commission, 2 a finding was made
that the public necessity and convenience would permit the proposed
abandonment and, accordingly, a certificate was issued.3 In the report
accompanying the certificate, the commission said, "Whether the aban-
donment would be in violation of the law of Georgia is not a question within
our jurisdiction. ' 4
Determined to defeat the railway's proposed abandonment, Georgia
filed a bill in equity in its own state court 5 to enjoin the defendant from
abandoning the road on the ground that it would be a breach of the
charter contract, causing irreparable injury to the state and its citizens.
The Supreme Court dismissed the proceedings on the ground that the
state court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the order of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.
If this was an action to enjoin the order of the Commission it would
seem that the court ruled correctly in denying itself jurisdiction;6 nor
would it matter that it was an indirect attempt to enjoin the order.7 The
exclusive jurisdiction to issue decrees enjoining or invalidating orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission is vested in the federal district
courts.8 But if, as contended by the state, the relief sought does not con-
flict with the commission's order, and therefore was not a suit to enjoin
it, the state court had jurisdiction and should have adjudicated the rights
of the parties. The sole question in the instant case is whether the order
was qualified as claimed by the state.9
2 212 I.C.C. 749 (1936). 3 228 I.C.C. Report 59 (1938).
4 See note 3, supra. 5 See note 1,.supra.
6 State of Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission & R.L.B., 258 U.S. 158, 42
S. Ct. 261, 66 L. Ed. 531 (1921); Venner v. Michigan Cent. R.R. Co., 271 U.S. 127,
46 S. Ct. 444, 70 L. Ed. 868 (1925).
7 Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 42 S. Ct.
349, 66 L. Ed. 671 (1921); Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. State Public Utilities Commission,
245 U.S. 493, 38 S. Ct. 170, 62 L. Ed. 425 (1917); Venner v. Michigan Cent. R.R. Co.,
271 U.S. 127, 46 S. Ct. 444, 70 L. Ed. 868 (1925).
8 28 U.S.C.A. § 467.
9 Note 3, supra. Looking to the Commission's opinion itself, we find first a
statement of the financial condition of the road with other facts material to an
abandonment proceedings. The Commission refers then to the state's argument
that the proposed abandonment would violate their charter right It is immedi-
ately following this that the Commission makes the statement that it has no
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the state's claim under its charter.
Thereafter come the findings that the public necessity and convenience permits
the abandonment and that to continue the operation of the road would impose a
burden upon interstate commerce. The Commission concluded with its order,
unqualified in terms, granting the defendant permission to abandon the road.
Thus it seems rather obvious that the statement in question was made merely
in answer to the state's contention immediately preceding it.
That the certificate authorizing abandonment is permissive in nature, and not
mandatory, should not lessen its binding effect upon the state. To prevent the
railroad from doing what the Commission says it may do is as much an inter-
ference with the regulation of interstate commerce as it is to prevent the rail-
road from doing what the Commission has ordered it to do. See Chicago Junction
Case, 264 U.S., 258, 44 S. Ct. 317, 68 L. Ed. 667 (1924); Venner v. Michigan Cent.
R.R. Co., 271 U.S. 127, 46 S. Ct. 444, 70 L. Ed. 868 (1925).
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The state contended that the commission's statement to the effect
that it had no jurisdiction to determine whether the abandonment would
be a violation of the charter should be read into or in connection with the
order, which renders it a qualified order. The essence of the order, in its
view, is that so far as the Commission is concerned the defendant has its
permission to abandon the road but the order shall not be construed as
freeing the defendant of its obligation to the state. If by the state's conten-
tion it is meant that the Commission's statement, denying iself jurisdic-
tion to determine the validity of the State's charter right, has the effect,
in iself, of qualifying the order, then the contention appears to be without
merit. It is well settled that the authority of the Interstate Commerce
Commission over interstate commerce, is superior to the charter rights
of the state and it may abrogate those rights by its order.10 If, however,
the state's contention is that the Commission's statement in question im-
plies that the order was intended to be qualified, i.e., that the statement
would not have been made unless the order was intended to be qualified,
the contention is sound. But that is merely to conclude that the existence
of the statement "is evidence" that the order was intended to be qualified;
it remains to be determined whether the qualification has been sufficient-
ly proven.
The state relies solely upon this one statement of the Commission to
support its contention that the order is qualified. There seems to be no
other evidence supporting that contention, while on the contrary, many
facts seem to point to an opposite conclusion.
It cannot be doubted that it is within the Commission's discretion to
qualify or condition its orders under the proper circumstances." The
Interstate Commerce Act expressly provides therefor where the public
necessity and convenience requires it.12 It would seem to follow that if
the circumstances were such that a qualified order would be inconsistent
with the requirements of public convenience and necessity it would be
improper and an abuse of discretion to issue such an order.13 In the in-
10 Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 46 S. Ct. 454, 70 L. Ed. 884 (1926):
"The contract claimed between the State and Colorado & Southern may not
prevail against the paramount power of Congress through the Commission to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce." State of New York v. United States,
257 U.S. 591, 42 S. Ct. 239, 66 L. Ed. 385 (1921). Even explicit charter provisions
must yield to the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission. U.S. v.
Village of Hubbard, 266 U.S. 474, 45 S. Ct. 160, 69 L. Ed. 389 (1924); Phila., Balt.
& Wash. R.R. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603, 32 S. Ct. 589, 56 L. Ed. 911 (1911);
Sharfman, Interstate Commerce Commission (1931), Vol. II, p. 249.
11 Construction of Line by Jefferson Southwestern, 86 I.C.C. 796 (1924); In The
Matter of the Application of the Eastern Texas Railroad Company. For a Certifi.
cate of Convenience and Necessity, 65 I.C.C. 436, 71 I.C.C. 20 (1922).
12 49 U.S.C.A. § 20. The Commission shall have power to issue such certificates
as prayed for, or to refuse to issue it, or to issue it for a portion or portions
of a line of railroad, or extension thereof, described in the application, or for
the partial exercise only of such right or privilege, and may attach to the
issuance of the certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the
public convenience and necessity may require.
13 While the Commission's field of discretion is large its limits are well defined.
It is limited to acts, administrative in nature, which tend to promote or regulate
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stant case, the Commission found that the public convenience and neces-
sity permit the abandonment of the road. Public convenience and neces-
sity has been defined as an immediate and urgent public need14 and in-
cludes a consideration of both interstate and intrastate requirements. 1
The Commission also found that the continued operation of the road would
be a burden upon interstate commerce, 16 and the findings of the Com-
mission as to the financial condition of the road seem to justify this con-
clusion. 17 It is inconceivable that the burden on interstate commerce
could be anything but greater if the railroad abandons only its interstate
business and is compelled to continue its intrastate operations.' s The con-
clusion that the public convenience and necessity not only permit the pro-
posed abandonment but requires that the railroad be authorized by an un-
qualified order to abandon, completely, the operation of the road. In this
view bf the matter it would not only seem improper to issue a qualified
order, leaving to the state the ultimate determination, but it is doubtful
that the Commission would so disregard its own findings.
Much can be said about the interest of a state in an abandonment
proceedings. 19 Generally such proceedings are of vital concern to the
state. Many private commercial interests may depend considerably upon
the continued operation of the road, cities or towns may have granted
special rights or property interest to induce the construction of the road,
the state may have special rights acquired in consideration of granting
the charter. While these are all factors to be considered in determining
what the public necessity and convenience requires, they are not neces-
sarily controlling upon the Commission where the railroad is engaged in
interstate commerce. 20 In the instant case, the state and several of its
private interests appeared at the hearing and presented their arguments
interstate commerce. See United States v. Reading Co., 228 U.S. 158, 33 S. Ct.
509, 57 L. Ed. 779 (1912); Cin., N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. Int. Com. Com., 162 U.S.
184, 16 S. Ct. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935 (1895); Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm.,
211 U.S. 407, 29 S. Ct. 115, 53 L. Ed. 253 (1908).
14 Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Railroad Commission, 162 Wis. 383, 156 N.W.
614 (1916); In re Shelton St. Ry. Co., 70 Conn. 329, 38 A. 362 (1897); Public
Convenience Application of Utah Terminal Ry., 72 I.C.C. 89 (1922).
15 Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 at 168, 46 S. Ct. 454, 70 L. Ed. 884
(1926): "The sole test prescribed is that abandonment be consistent with public
necessity and convenience. In determining whether it is, the Commission must
have regard to the needs of both intrastate and interstate commerce. . . . The
benefit to one of the abandonment must be weighed against the inconvenience
and loss to which the other will thereby be subjected. Conversely, the benefits to
particular communities and commerce of continued operation must be weighed
against the burden thereby imposed upon other commerce."
16 Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 46 S. Ct. 454, 70 L. Ed. 884 (1926),
stating that to operate a road at a loss may be to impose a burden upon inter-
state commerce. See also Sharfman, Interstate Commerce Commission, II, p. 264.
17 See note 3, supra.
18 Sharfman, Interstate Commerce Commission, II, p. 266.
19 Sharfman, Interstate Commerce Commission, p. 261-3.
20 New York Cent. R. Co. v. Central New England Ry. Co., 264 Mass. 128, 162
N.E. 324 (1928); Abandonment of Branch Line by Mobile & Ohio R.R., 138 I.C.C.
305 (1928); Sharfman, Interstate Commerce Commission, II, p. 261.
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against the proposed abandonment. Thus any of the factors which the
state might have considered had it been empowered to authorize or reject
the application for abandonment were before the Commission when it
issued the certificate.
In the instant case, the suit, having been removed to the federal
district court, was remanded to the state court on the ground that it was
not a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
21
The state points to this action of the federal court as an adjudication, bind-
ing on the defendants, that the action was not one to enjoin the order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. As explained in the majority opinion, 22
the complaint in this case is based upon a supposed contractual right
arising from the charter. It is only by an anticipation of the defense and
by the answer itself that the federal question arises; that is not sufficient
to meet the requirements of the removal statute. 23 In other words the
federal court merely decided that the cause of action set out in the com-
plaint did not by itself, raise a federal question; it did not deny that the
ultimate purpose of the action was to enjoin the order of the Commission.
In conclusion, the facts do not authorize a dogmatic statement as to
what was the intention of the Commission concerning the nature of the
order, but the fact that only the one ambiguous statement suggest a quali-
fied order while many factors establish the propriety and probability of an
absolute and unqualified order would seem to justify the decision in this
case. However, it should be observed that if the order was intended to be
absolute and unqualified the statement of the Commission denying itself
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the State's contractual right, is
not only uncalled for and irrevelent, as characterized by the court, but in
fact, based upon an erroneous assumption that the State's right was not
subordinate to a conflicting order of the Commission but actually sur-
vived it. W. H. MAYNOR
BILLS AND NOTEs-CoNsTRUCTION AND OPERATION-SuRVIVAL OF DocTRINE
or DEscRIPTIo PERSONAE UNDER NEOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW WHERE
PRINTED NOTE BEAs JOINT PROMISE.-In Kaspar American State Bank v.
Oul Homestead Association,1 the Illinois Appellate Court considered the
application of Section 20 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law to
the doctrine of descriptio personae. The note in litigation was on the usual
printed form and contained the customary confession of judgment clause.
It purported to bind the "undersigned jointly and severally," however,
and was signed:
21 State of Georgia v. Southern Ry. Co., 25 Fed. Supp. 630 (1938).
22 Southern Ry. Co. v. State, 4 S.E. (2d) 233 at 235 (1939).
23 28 U.S.C.A. § 71, Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S., 57 S. Ct. 96, 81 L. Ed.
70, 109 (1936): "To bring a cause within the removal statute a right or immunity
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element,
and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action . . . and the controversy
must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or
petition for removal . . . nor can the complaint itself be considered in so far
as it goes beyond a statement of the plaintiff's cause of action and anticipates
a defense."
1 301 IMl. App. 326. 22 N.E. (2d) 785 (1939).
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"Oul Homestead Association
Albert Hornick, Pres.
James L. Preisler, Sec'y
James Bican, Treas."
Judgment was confessed in the circuit court against not only the asso-
ciation but the three individual signers as well. The circuit court over-
ruled defendants' motion to vacate, and the appellate court sustained.
Each of the three justices wrote an opinion. Mr. Justice McSurely, writing
the "opinion of the court," sustained the judgment on two grounds; (1),
that the doctrine of descriptio personae controls, Section 20 being inappli-
cable because the joint language of the note indicated an intention to be
bound personally; and (2), that the defendants' affidavit to open up the
judgment was insufficient. 2 Mr. Justice Matchett concurs, apparently on
the second ground only. Mr. Justice O'Connor, "dissenting in part," feels
very strongly that Section 20 should control.
Section 20 provides in part: "Where the instrument contains, or a
person adds to his signature, words indicating that he signs for or on be-
half of the principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on
the instrument if he was duly authorized. . .. 9)
Prior to the statute, courts gave effect to the doctrine of descriptio
personae in a number of decisions of varying degrees of cogency. Some
courts say that parol evidence is inadmissible to show the agency.4
Others say that the question of agency vel non cannot be raised by de-
murrer.5 At least one case disposes of the problem by treating the defense
of the agent as a personal one, not available against a holder in due
course.6
The opinion relies on the case of Healey v. Storey,7 but there the note
was drawn thus-"We jointly and severally promise-" and was signed
by defendants as directors. The court also cites the case of Savage v. Rix;8
there the words, "jointly and severally," obviously created personal li-
ability, since no principal was named.
Cases holding the agents immune decided before and after the statute
have a converse gradation in strength. Some say a defendant's demurrer
will suffice. 9 Numerous cases permit the introduction of parol evidence.10
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110. § 259.26. 8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 98, § 40.
4 Dutton v. Marsh, 6 Q.B. 361 (1871); Heffner v. Brownell, 75 Iowa 341, 39 N.W.
640 (1888); McCandless v. Belle Plaine Canning Co., 78 Iowa 161, 42 N.W. 635,
16 Am. St. Rep. 429. 4 L.R.A. 396 (1889). For a case holding that there is a
presumption of personal liability, see Lumley v. Kinsella Glass Co., 85 Ill.
App. 412 (1899).
5 Duffner v. Ball, 86 Il. App. 519 (1899); Taylor v. Reger, 18 Ind. App. 466,
48 N.E. 262, 63 Am. St. Rep. 352 (1897); Bayh v. Hanna, 69 Ind. App, 348, 122
N.E. 7 (1919).
6 Bank v. Wallis, 150 N.Y. 455, 44 N.E. 1038 (1896).
7 3 Exch. 3, 154 Eng. Rep. 731 (1848). 8 9 N.H. 263 (1838).
9 Gleason v. Sanitary Milk Supply Co., 93 Me. 544 45 A. 825, 74 Am. St. Rep.
370 (1900); Cannon v. Miller Rubber Products Co., 128 Ohio St. 172. 190 N.E.
210 (1934).
10 Decowski v. Grabarski, 181 Ill. App. 279 (1913); Tampa Investment & Securi-
ties Co. v. Taylor. 272 Ill. App. 541 (1933); Scanlon v. Keith, 102 Ill. 634 (1882);
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Some courts say that the note is on its face that of the principal." Besides
these, there are numerous cases, not easily catalogued, in which the
courts refused to consider the signers liable individually.'
2
It would seem that the instant decision is not only contrary to the
weight of authority but against the rising tendency, evident even prior to
the statute, toward relieving the agent of liability.
13 Jump v. Sparling14
held that the Negotiable Instruments Law abrogated the law merchant on
this subject and held the makers not individually liable. As early as 1839,
the Massachusetts court, in a well-considered opinion, stated succinctly
what would seem to be the modern attitude: "The particular form of ex-
ecuting a contract not under seal, by an agent is not material if it indicate
a ministerial act on the part of the agent.' 5
In concluding, it should be reiterated that the opinion giving effect to
the doctrine of descriptio personae in preference to Section 20 represents
the position of only one justice. This position must be carefully noted,
however, inasmuch as it appears in the "opinion of the court," and, being
included as such in the headnotes of both the official and unofficial re-
ports, will be perpetuated in the digests. J. C. KELLOGG
BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE - NATURE AND FORM OF ACTION - WHEN
ACTION WILL LIE IN FRAUD AND DECEIT IN JURISDICTION WHERE ACTION FOR
BREACH OF PROMIsE Is ABOLISHED BY STA'rUTE.-The defendant by falsely
representing that he was an unmarried man induced the plaintiff to enter
into and consummate a void marriage with him. The plaintiff brought a
civil action sounding in fraud and deceit to recover damages for this
wrong and was met with the defense that actions "based upon alleged
Williams v. Harris, 198 Ill. 501, 64 N.E. 988 (1902); Briel v. Bank, 172 Ala. 475,
55 So. 808 (1911); Planters' Chemical and Oil Co. v. Stearnes, 189 Ala. 503, 66 So.
699 (1914); Western Grocer Co. v. Lackman, 75 Kans. 34, 88 P. 527 (1907); Taylor
v. Fluharty, 35 Ida. 705, 208 P. 866 (1922); Carpenter v. Farnsworth, 106 Mass.
561 (1871); Myers v. Chesley, 190 Mo. App. 371, 177 S.W. 326 (1915). In fact,
parol evidence was admitted although the note contained the words, "each and
every party singing this note as officer or agent . . . also binds himself as
principal ...... See also Union Machinery & Supply Co. v. Taylor-Morrison
Logging Co., 143 Wash. 154, 254 P. 1094 (1927).
11 Miers v. Coates, 57 Ill. App. 216 (1894); Derby v. Gustafson, 131 Ill. App.
281 (1907); Spiller-Beall Co. v. Hirsch, 18 Ga. App. 450, 89 S.E. 587 (1916);
Aungst v. Creque, 72 Ohio St. 551, 74 N.E. 1073 (1905).
12 Northeastern Coal Co. v. Tyrrell, 133 Ill. App. 472 (1907); Mathis v. Liberty
Straw Spreader Co., 238 Ill. App. 467 (1925); Reeve v. Bank, 54 N.J.L. 208, 23 A.
853, 16 L.R.A. 143 (1892); Wilson v. Fite, 46 S.W. 1056, (Tenn., 1897); Warford v.
Temple, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2268, 73 S.W. 1223 (1903); Hughes v. Washington Finance
Corp., 218 Ky. 729, 292 S.W. 335 (1927); Bank v. Mariner, 129 Wis. 544, 109 N.W.
574 (1906); Consumers' Twine & Machinery Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Thermo Tank
Co., 196 Iowa 64, 194 N.W. 290 (1923); Bank v. Rose City Creamery Co., 207 Mich.
81, 173 N.W. 481 (1919); Wright v. Drury Petroleum Corp., 229 Mich. 542, 201
N.W. 484 (1924); Raney's Adm'r v. Winter, 37 Ala. 277 (1861); Draper v.
Massachusetts Steam Heating Co., 87 Mass. 338 (1862).
13 Brannon's Negotiable Instruments Law (5th ed.), pp. 256-275.
14 218 Mass. 324, 105 N.E. 878 (1914).
15 Rice v. Gove. 22 Pick. (Mass.) 158, 33 Am. Dec. 724 (1839).
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. . . breach of contract to marry" were abolished by statute.' It was held
in Snyder v. Snyder 2 that the action was "neither within the letter or the
intendment of the law," and the defendant's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint was denied. Sulkowski v. Szcweczyk, 3 a contrary decision involving
a problem identical with that of the Snyder case save for the sole factor
that the plaintiff had not entered into the bigamous marriage, was dis-
tinguished on that ground.
Attempts to reconcile such decisions construing statutes abolishing or
penalizing the use of the action for breach of promise to marry should be
made with special regard to the nature of the cause of action. At a time be-
fore assumpsit had evolved, the only remedy in the -English law for fail-
ure to perform a parol agreement was the action in case for property con-
veyed or expense incurred in reliance upon a promise which was later
broken. 4 Thus breach of an agreement to convey land, 5 to build a house,6
or to marry7 was actionable if money had been transferred in reliance
thereon. This remedy, it should be noticed, rested solely upon a tort theory
and not upon any contractual basis.8 As liability ex contractu gradually
emerged from liability ex delicto, it seems probable that liability for
breach of promise to marry emerged with it9 because of a deceiving sim-
ilarity between engagements and other agreements.' 0 Thanks to the doc-
trine of stare decisis, contractual liability for breach of promise was im-
posed-although not without protest"-by the American courts, which
1 New York Laws of 1935, Ch. 263; Civil Practice Act, Art. 2-A, §§ 61-a et seq.
Cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 246.1 et seq., imposing criminal penalties upon
one filing suit for breach of promise to marry and declaring void all contracts
in settlement of such a suit
2 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 815 (1939). 3 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 97 (1938).
4 J. B. Ames, "The History of Assumpsit," 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1-19.
5 Keil. 77, 72 Eng. Rep. 239: "Et auxy si jeo vende x acres de terre pcel de
mon Manor, & puis jeo face feoffment del Manor, vous averes bon action vers
moy sur vostr case, pur cause del resceit de vre money .... "
6 Keil. 78, 72 Eng. Rep. 239: "Et si jeo covenant ove un Carpenter de faire
un meason, & paie a luy xx 1'. pur le meason a faire p un certeine jour, & il ne
face le meason p le jour, ore jeo av bon action sur mon case per cause de pay-
ment de ma money, & uncore il ne sound forsq en covenant, & sans paymt de
money en cest case nul remedie .. "
7 Anon. Cro. El. 79, 78 Eng. Rep. 339.
8 J. B. Ames, "The History of Assumpsit," 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1 at 15.
9 Stretch v. Parker, Mich. 12; Car. Rot. 21; Rolle's Abr. (1668); Mills v. Middle-
ton, 1 Keble 866, 83 Eng. Rep. 1289 (1685); Harrison v. Cage & Ux, Carthew 467, 90
Eng. Rep. 870; 5 Mod. 411, 87 Eng. Rep. 736; 1 Salk. 24, 91 Eng. Rep. 23 (1888).
10 Harter F. Wright, "The Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise," 10
Virg. L. Rev. 361.
'1 See Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29 (1877), in which the court after some difficulty
reached the conclusion that the action would lie. It is submitted that there
should be no remedy in contract at all. It must be admitted that mutual promises
to marry could be valid consideration for each other. But it must not be for-
gotten that nothing is consideration which the parties do not regard as such.
"It should be noted that not every variation from one's legal duty-not every
actual legal detriment incurred by the promisee at the request of the promisor,
though intrinsically the stuff of which consideration is made, will constitute a
sufficient consideration. It may be a mere incidental or friendly detriment not
intended as an ingredient for a bargain, and, therefore, not a bargained-for
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have built up a body of law, punctuated with vestigial doctrines reminis-
cent of the period when the remedy was in tort, retained for reasons of
policy. Thus it has been held at common law12 and under survival stat-
utes 13 not expressly governing promises to marry that the action for
breach of promise does not survive the parties to the agreement, contrary
to the general rule in regard to contracts but in accordance with the gen-
eral rule in regard to torts. The type of damages allowed in these cases,
including recovery for such things as injury to reputation, 14 mental suf-
fering,15 and seduction 6 are strikingly tortious in nature. Moreover, it
has been consistently decided that no action will lie for malicious inter-
ference with an engagement, 17 although it is beyond dispute that such
consideration." Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed., 1936), I, 322. "The similarity to
other mutual agreements originally led the courts into allowing the action. As
a fresh matter today it might well be doubted whether the commercial spirit
is sufficiently apparent in the exchange of promises to show an intention of
creating a contract in the sense in which contracts are enforced by the courts.
The action seems peculiar to the common law." Note, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 372. See
also N. P. Feinsinger, "Legislative Attack on 'Heart Balm,' " 33 Mich. L. Rev.
979; "Contracts to Marry," note, 25 Col. L. Rev. 343, suggesting that the doctrine
of illusory promise might apply; Harter F. Wright, "The Action for Breach of
the Marriage Promise," 10 Virg. L. Rev. 361, raising the problem of enforceability
of social obligations.
See also Pollock on Contracts (9th ed.), p. 3.; Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed.,
1936) I, 38, . 14, § 21.
12 Stebbins v. Palmer, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 71 (1822), in which the court justified
its position by the statement that "the principal ground of damages is disap-
pointed hope; the injury complained of is violated faith, more resembling in
substance deceit and fraud, than a mere common breach of promise."
13 Warner v. Allen, 126 Wash. 393, 218 P. 260, 34 A.L.R. 1358 (1923); Grubb's
adm'r v. Sult, 32 Gratt. (Va.) 203 (1879), where the court stated that "although a
breach of promise to marry is a violation of contract, it is yet essentially a tort
to the person, and comes so fully within the reason and influence of the principle
governing actions ex delicto, it is impossible to distinguish between them." See
also, Spence v. Carter, 33 Ga. App. 279, 125 S.E. 883 (1924). The cases all state
that the presence of special damages would change the rule, but see notes in 2
Cor. L. Q. 42 and 28 Harv. L. Rev. 701 which indicate that "special damages"
are a myth.
14 Gauerke v. Kiley, 171 Wis. 543, 177 N.W. 889 (1920).
15 Harrison v. Swift, 13 Allen (Mass.) 144 (1866).
16 Poehlmann v. Kertz, 204 In. 418, 68 N.E. 467 (1903).
17 Leonard v. Whetstone, 34 Ind. App. 383, 68 N.E. 197, 107 Am. St. Rep. 252
(1903); Homan v. Hall, 102 Neb. 70, 165 N.W. 881, L.R.A. 1918C 1195 (1917); Guida
v. Pontrelli, 186 N.Y.S. 147 (1921); noted in 6 Cor. L. Q. 437, approving the result
but disapproving the ground of the decision; Stiffler v. Boehm, 206 N.Y.S. 187
(1924), noted in 10 Cor. L. Q. 259, suggesting that the doctrine is based on an
unsupported statement by Cooley and declaring the rule to be unsound as
stated, but approving the decision on the ground that the action brought was
one for alienation of affections and not for malicious interference with contract,
25 Col. L. Rev. 230, and 34 Yale L. J. 526, criticizing the case for not making
clear whether public policy was the basis of the decision and declaring that the
prospective right of consortium, in the absence of public policy, is just as
worthy of protection as the present right; Ableman v. Holman, 190 Wis. 112, 208
N.W. 889, 47 A.L.R. 440 (1926); Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169 N.E. 491, 73
A.L.R. 1448 (1929), placing the decision squarely on the grounds of public policy.
But see Minsky v. Satenstein, 6 N.J. Misc. 978, 143 A. 512 (1928), limiting non-
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interference with any other contract would be a legal wrong.' 8 Further
departures from standard contract principles exist. Thus the defense that
the plaintiff has some ailment known to the defendant at the time of the
agreement, but which would nevertheless interfere with normal marital
relations between the parties, has been allowed. 19 While infancy is in gen-
eral a defense, 20 it has been held that an infant defendant who seduced
his betrothed was estopped to set up his infancy.21 Where the defendant
was married to a third party at the time of his promise to marry the
plaintiff, the courts, without reference to estoppel, have decided that con-
sideration was present, although the plaintiff's promise was impossible
of performance. 22 It has also been decided that an oral agreement to
marry to be performed more than a year after the formation of the agree-
ment is not affected by the fourth section of the statute of frauds.23 It has
been truly said: "Promise of marriage may be a contract, but it is one
forming its own class, and in its essential features greatly differs from all
others." 24
The remedy for breach of an agreement to marry has been recently
curtailed by state legislation25 abolishing the action26 and placing crim-
inal penalties upon its use.27 The primary motive for this type of legisla-
liability to parents who have an absolute privilege and approved in 27 Mich. L.
Rev. 478; and Jacobs v. Schweinert, 114 N.J. 358, 168 A. 741 (1933), accepting the
lead of the Minsky case and imposing liability upon plaintiff's rival for the
affections of the man in question.
18 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) II, 184, § 227.
19 "So far as the principles of contract are concerned one who knows at the
time of the engagement of the defective physical condition of himself or of the
one to whom he engages himself cannot subsequently make a continuance of the
same condition ground of objection if such continuance was reasonably fore-
seeable. . . . But the marriage of the parties may be so obviously opposed to
public policy that the law will not enforce liability .. " Williston on Contracts(Rev. ed., 1936), VI, 5444, § 1943. See Grover v. Zook, 44 Wash. 489, 87 P. 638, 120
Am. St. Rep. 1012, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 582, 12 Ann. Cas' 192 (1906); Parks v. Marshall,
322 Mo. 218, 14 S.W. (2d) 590, 62 A.L.R. 835 (1929).
20 Corbin v. Gomes, 49 R.I. 300, 142 A. 328 (1928).
21 Sawicki v. Slahor, 11 N.J. Misc. 604, 167 A. 691 (1933).
22 Wild v. Harris, 7 C.B. 999, 137 Eng. Rep. 395 (1849); Millward v. Littlewood,
5 Exch. 775, 155 Eng. Rep. 339 (1850); Blattmacher v. Saal, 29 Barb. (N.Y.) 22
(1858); Coover v. Davenport, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 368 (1870); Kelley v. Riley, 106
Mass. 339 (1871); Robinson v. Shockley, Tex. Civ. App., 266 S.W. 420 (1924);
Kerns v. Hagenbuchle, 17 N.Y.S. 367 (1892). See E. W. Hope, "Ignorance of
Impossibility as Affecting Consideration," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 679 for an excellent
discussion of the problem.
23 Blackburn v. Mann, 85 Ill. 222 (1877); Brick v. Gannar, 36 Hun. (N.Y.) 52
(1885); Lewis v. Tapman, 90 Md. 294, 45 A. 459 (1900). For a collection of the
cases pro and con see L.R.A. 1915D 1190.
24 Warner v. Benham, 126 Wash. 393, 218 P. 260 (1923). The peculiarities have
undoubtedly been retained for reasons of policy, but their connection with the
law of tort is significant.
25 See Vernier, American Family Laws (1938 Supp.), p. 6.
26 The New York act, note 1 supra, contains such an abolition clause, as well as
a criminal clause.
27 The Illinois act, note 1 supra, contains only a criminal penalty and no
abolition clause. This is especially interesting in view of the case of Pennington
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tion seems to be a desire to eliminate the use of the action as a black-
mailing device, although other reasons of almost equal importance exist.28
Thus fear of a damage suit, rather than love for a prospective spouse,
might be the primary motive for a marriage which would probably termi-
nate in divorce. Furthermore, the feeling existed that engagements were
social obligations and not legal obligations entitled to legal enforcement.
The speculative nature of the allowable elements of damage likewise
made possible abuse by sympathetic juries. 29
Decisions like those in the Sulkowski and Snyder cases must be evalu-
ated in the light of such considerations, tempered by a normal policy in
favor of an innocent, guileless plaintiff who has been done a grievous
wrong. The fact that the two complaints were framed in tort-probably to
avoid the effect of the express language of the statute-is not significant,
since the cases decided before the passing of the act allowed recovery in
either tort 0 or contract, 1 where the defendant was married to another
at the time of his promise to the plaintiff. The courts should disregard the
form of the complaint and pierce through to the fundamental nature of the
wrongs sought to be remedied to determine whether they were within or
v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E. (2d) 619 (1937), which held that the Indiana
penal provision was violative of due process. See note, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 182.
28 For material on the policies which led to the passage of these statutes, see
Vernier, American Family Laws, I, 23 et seq.; R. C. Brown, "Breach of Promise
Suits," 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 474 (1929); J. Schouler, "Breach of Promise," 7
South. L. Rev. (N.S.) 57; J. D. White, "Breach of Promise of Marriage," 10 L. Q.
Rev. 135; Harter F. Wright, "The Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise,"
10 Virg. L. Rev. 361; N. P. Feinsinger, "'Legislative Attack on 'Heart Balm,' "
33 Mich. L. Rev. 979. See also notes in 25 Col. L. Rev. 343 and 7 Harv. L. Rev.
372. In this connection it is interesting to note that the presence of the Illinois
provision in the criminal code, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, §§ 246.1 et seq.,
indicates clearly that the primary motive of the Illinois legislature in passing
the act was to prevent extortion.
29 McCormick on Damages, 404, presents a table showing the exaggerated
amounts that have been allowed. For an unusual viewpoint, see Ashley v.
Dalton, 81 So. 488 (Miss., 1919): "Yet it might be proper to remind others of
his type that he who would trip the light fantastic toe with the terpsichorean
maid must contribute coin to the man who extracts music from the violin
strings, or, in other words, that pleasure must be paid for with coin of the
realm; and to remind them of the truth expressed by a minor poet when he said:
'When of 'dough' we get a batch,
The women make us toe the scratch,
And he who courts and does not wed,
She will pull his leg in court instead.'
"Beware of the grass widow when her eyes beam love and the shades are
down low. She hypnotizes the reason, and the soul escapes the prison bars of
discretion, and 'you float airily on golden clouds to rosy lands of pleasure and
joy.' Temporary bliss reigns supreme in the palace of love; but in the end it
creates mournful memories, heartache, remorse of conscience, and a burning
desire to 'blot out the past.' "
80 Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434 (1868); Pollock v. Sullivan, 53 Vt. 507, 38
Am. St. Rep. 702 (1881).
81 Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339 (1871); Blattmacher v. Saal, 29 Barb. (N.Y.)
22 (1858). Of course, if the plaintiff knew of the married status of the defendant
at the time of the agreement, no recovery would be allowed on the grounds of
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without the intended prohibition of the statute. By following such an ap-
proach, it seems that both cases were correctly decided. The Sulkowski
decision presents a situation in which the plaintiff, though elements of
fraud were present, was primarily seeking recovery for an unperformed
promise. 2 In the Snyder case, by contrast, the wrong was not a simple
failure to perform a social agreement but a physical violation of the plain-
tiff's person.83 By such analysis it also appears that the reasons behind
the legislation were satisfied. The former case presents a situation within
which the blackmailer may still operate, though with a smaller number of
potential victims;34 the latter presents one which scarcely lends itself to
extortion.83 The action in the former smacks too strongly of enforcing a
social agreement, while in the latter the wrong being remedied arises
from the personal tort. While the damages in each case would be specu-
lative, the nature of the wrong in the Snyder case makes such damages
no more objectionable than they are in other fields of law where they are
allowed.3 6 This approach enables the courts, by the process of construc-
tion, to effectuate the desired purposes of statutes like that involved in
the instant cases, and yet still avoid the criticism which flows from having
harsh cases made into bad law. W. L. SCHLEGEL, JR.
INsURANE-Loss BY DEFECTS iN TITLE INsURED--MEAsURE OF DAMAGES
IN ACTION BY PURCHASER AGAINST TITLE INSURER FOR BREACH OF TITLE PoLIcY
BECAUSE OF INCUMBRANCE ON LAND.-The case of Beaullieu v. Atlanta Title
and Trust Company,1 recently decided by the Court of Appeals of Georgia,
suggests an interesting problem involving the determination of the meas-
ure of damages where the purchaser of land sues a title insurance com-
pany for a breach of its title policy arising from the existence of an in-
cumbrance on the land.
public policy. See Noice v. Brown, 33 N.J. Law 228 (1876). But the agreement
does not become illegal because thereafter the plaintiff dispovers the defendant's
prior marriage but nevertheless continues the engagement. Cammerer v. Muller,
14 N.Y.S. 511 (1891).
32 The tort of deceit does not seem to be present, since no damage was alleged.
"As we read the complaint, the question as to whether the plaintiff may main-
tain an action to recover articles given to the defendant as presents or the value
thereof, does not arise in this action." Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 97
at 99. For a statement of the rule as to requisite damage to the tort of deceit
see Restatement of Torts, § 549.
33 The violation of plaintiff's person consisted in the consummation of the
marriage. To the defense of consent, the answer is fraud. See Restatement of
Torts, § 13 (b), comment g.
34 The only difference between the Sulkowski situation and the average breach
of promise action is the married status of defendant, and that makes him all the
more choice a victim for extortionists.
85 A plan of extortion under the Snyder situation would require that the victim
actually marry the woman; mere embarrassing situations would not suffice as
basis for the threatened suit at law and consequent exposure of the victim's
frailties. It seems probable that few men would consummate the bigamous
marriage, and those who did would be unworthy of protection.
36 McCormick on Damages, § 88.
1 4 S.E. (2d) 78 (Ga. 1939).
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In that case the plaintiff had purchased a tract of land and had ob-
tained a title guaranty policy from the defendant to insure himself against
all loss or damages arising from a defect in title or the existence of a lien
or other incumbrances upon the property. After taking possession of the
property and commencing to build a house thereon, the plaintiff discover-
ed the existence of an easement in the nature of a right of way across his
land and brought an action against the title insurer for breach of its title
guaranty contract, alleging as his damages the difference between the
market values of the property incumbered and unincumbered, measured
as of the date of the policy. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's alle-
gation of the measure of damages 2 and claimed that the correct measure
of damages was the difference between the purchase price and the market
value of the incumbered property at the date of the policy. 3 The Georgia
Appellate Court overruled the defendant's objections and allowed the
plaintiff damages according to his allegation, i.e., measured by the de-
crease in the market value of the property as a result of the incumbrance.
The court based its decision upon two grounds; first, that, where the
purchaser sues the vendor for breach of covenant against incumbrances,
the measure of damages is the decrease in market value as a result of the
incumbrance, 4 i.e., the actual loss sustained as compared to a mere re-
covery of a proportionate part of the purchase price with interest, and
second, that a title guaranty policy is a contract of indemnity 5 in which
the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured vendee for the actual loss he
sustains.0
The instant case seems sound, and is in accord with the leading
authorities 7 as well as with the few other cases discussing the particular
2 The defendant admitted the breach of the title guaranty contract, and its
liability therefor, but attacked, by special demurrer, the matter of damages only.
3 The issue raised becomes significant only where for some reason the purchase
price is less than the market value of the property at the date of the policy.
Ordinarily the purchase price and the market value are the same and the courts
will consider the former as good evidence of the latter. See McCormick, Damages,
693, 4; In re Gordon, 317 Pa. 161, 176 A. 494 (1935); Title Ins. Co. of Richmond v.
Industrial Bank of Richmond, 156 Va. 322, 157 S.E. 710 (1931).
4 Murphy v. United States Title Guaranty Co., 172 N.Y.S. 243 (1918), wherein
the court said, "In many points the covenants of title contained in a deed and
the covenant of indemnity in a title insurance are analogous, and in absence of
express words in the contract of insurance the same rules would apply." See also
Smith v. White, 71 W. Va. 639, 78 S.E. 378, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 623 (1913); Bronson
v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 11 Am. Rep. 335 (1871); Morgan v. Smith, 11 Ill. 194
(1849); Hansen v. Pattberg, 206 N.Y.S. 866 (1924); Sutherland, Damages, III,
3093, § 840a.
5 Cyc. of Insurance Law 5, § 3 (Couch on Insurance); Cooley, Insurance, I, 6;
38 Cyc. of Law and Procedure 344; Foehrenbach v. German-American Title &
Trust Co., 217 Pa. 331, 66 A. 561 (1907); Sutherland on Damages, III, 3093, § 840a.
6 "The sole object of title insurance is to cover possibilities of loss through
defects that may cloud or invalidate titles. It is for the assumption of whatever
risk there may be, in such connection, that the premium is paid to, and accepted
by, the company .. " Foehrenbach v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 217
Pa. 331, 66 A. 561 (1907). See Sutherland on Damages, III, 2875, § 761.
7 Sutherland on Damages (4th ed.,), II, p. 2160. The vendee of incumbered land
may recover because of the existence of an encroachment the difference between
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issue involved.8 However, it seems unnecessary and of no particular
value to treat the liability of the insurer as analogous to the liability of a
vendor on his covenant against incumbrances.9 The more logical basis for
determining the measure of damages arises out of the nature of the title
policy. A title insurance policy is a contract of indemnity.10 Therefore, the
general rule as to the liability under indemnity contracts is applicable,
namely, that the insurer's liability is to indemnify the insured for the ac-
tual loss sustained." Consequently the measure of damages adhered to by
the plaintiff in the instant case, being the more accurate expression of
the actual loss, was correctly approved by the court.
The reviewing courts in Illinois have not been called upon to decide
a case involving the question, but it is reasonable to anticipate that Illi-
nois will follow the instant case.' 2 In Illinois the business of guaranteeing
the value of the land as it was and as it would have been if there had been no
encroachment. 5 Cyc. of Insurance Law 4489, § 1228; 38 Cyc. of Law and Pro-
cedure 344; 62 C. J. 1069, 70; Cooley on Insurance, VI, 5727-8.
8 Murphy v. U.S. Title Guaranty Co., 172 N.Y.S. 243 (1918), where the defect
was an outstanding 2/35 interest. The court said, "The highest possible measure
of damages, m the absence of some clause in the policy fixing a different measure,
would be the difference between the value of the premises unincumbered, as
shown by the actual sale, and their value incumbered by the lien .. " Kentucky
Title Co. v. Hail, 219 Ky. 256, 292 S.W. 817 (1927), where the grantor was unable
to convey all that the deed described, the court said that the measure of dam-
ages was not a proportionate part of the purchase price, but of the market value.
Glyn v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 117 N.Y.S. 424 (1909), where the defect was
an encroachment and the sole question before the court was whether a mere
lump sum allegation of damages was sufficient, but the court, after answering
in the affirmative, ventured to say that the measure of damages would be the
difference in the market value of the property incumbered and unincumbered.
Sala v. Security Title Insurance & Guarantee Co., 183 Okla. 534, 81 P. (2d) 578
(1938), where the plaintiff would have been able to recover the decrease in
market value but for the insurer taking advantage of the provision in the policy
permitting it to clear the title by defending the suit. Narberth Building & Loan
Ass'n. v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 190 A. 149 (Pa. 1937), where a mortgagee ob-
tained a title policy on the mortgaged property, and the measure of damages
was held to be the actual loss he sustained as a result of the defect, measured
as of the date of the policy. In re Gordon, 176 A. 494 (Pa. 1935). Accord: Mon-
temarano v. Home Title Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 478, 180 N.E. 241 (1932), holding that
insured was entitled to recover actual loss. Foehrenbach v. German-American
Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. 331, 66 A. 561 (1907), where the insured obtained a
policy to insure title to property to which he already had title. Upon discovering
that he had only a one half interest in the property he was allowed to recover
the value of that interest. Flockhart Foundry Co. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co.
102 N. J. L. 405, 132 A. 493 (1926), where the general rule of the measure of dam-
ages supported in the instant case was admitted, but the court said that the
insurance policy in question expressly provided for damages as of the time of
a re-sale.
9 If the liability of the title company is analogous to that of the vendor, the
liability would vary with the nature of the defect. For a complete discussion of
the measure of damages in actions against the grantor for the various types of
defects see McCormick, Damages, Ch. 28.
10 See note 5, supra.
11 Murphy v. United States Title Guaranty Co., 172 N.Y.S. 243 (1918); Mon-
temarano v. Home Title Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 478, 180 N.E. 241 (1932); 62 C.J. 1052.
12 As argued by the defendant in the instant case, the measure of damages
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titles is considered an insurance business,13 and the insurance contract
has been held to be a contract of indemnity14 in which the aforementioned
general rule as to liability applies.'5 It follows therefore that in Illinois,
also, the measure of damages should be the actual loss sustained, which in
this instance, would be the difference between the market value of the
property as incumbered and its unincumbered value, measured as of the
date of the policy. W. H. MAYNOR
MARRIAGE-STATUTORY RFQUIREMENTs-EvASION OF REQUIREMENT OF Ex-
AMINATION FOR VENEREAL DISEASE AS INVALIDATING MARRIAGE.-A forward
step toward the eradication of communicable venereal diseases in Illinois
was the passage of the so-called Saltiel Act,' providing for a pre-marital
examination of all candidates before the issuance of a license 2 to marry,
in order to prevent the unwitting communication of venereal diseases
from one spouse to the other and to the coming generation. Other juris-
dictions already had similar legislation, some providing for a pre-marital
examination of the male only, 3 but the Illinois act requires examination of
both the male and female. The constitutionality of similar enactments has
been upheld, the court in Peterson v. Widule4 stating as a reason that
"society has a right to protect itself from extinction and its members
from a fate worse than death."
The presence of such legislation, desirable though it be, seems to
invoke in the human mind a desire to avoid its beneficent safeguards and
too frequently drives the engaged couple into other jurisdictions where
marriage is easier to contract. 5 The social consequences thereof are ob-
could be the difference between the purchase price and the market value of the
incumbered property measured as of the date of the policy. The above rule, or
the one adopted in the instant case, might be changed to the extent that the
market value be determined as of the date of the suit or of resale. Neither
rule would be correct in the case of defects by way of permanent incumbrances;
the contract is breached at the time of the conveyance and the damages should
be measured as of that time. However, where the incumbrance is pecuniary,
e.g. a lien or mortgage, the purchaser should be limited to nominal damages
until he has removed the incumbrance, or has been evicted by an enforcement
of the lien.
13 People v. New York Title & Mortgage Co., 346 Ill. 278, 178 N.E. 661 (1931).
14 Vredenburgh v. Physician's Defense Co., 126 Ill. App. 509 (1906).
15 Curtis v. Baugh, 79 Ill. 242 (1875).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 89, § 6a.
2 The act was amended July 29, 1939, Laws 1939, p. 706 et seq., to allow issuance
of a license, ". . . (a) where the woman is pregnant at the time of such appli-
cation, or (b) when the woman has, prior to such application, given birth to an
illegitimate child which is living at the time of such application and the man
making such application makes affidavit that he is the father of such illegitimate
child . . . or (c) upon a finding that such marriage may be consummate without
serious danger to the health of either party .. .
3 Wis. Stats. 1937, Title 23, § 245.10.
4 157 Wis. 641 at 649, 147 N.W. 966 (1914). See also Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn.
242, 61 A. 604 (1905).
5 Moline Daily Dispatch, Feb. 2, 1940: "The (Illinois State Health) department
released compilation by counties showing the downward trend in the marriage
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vious; the legal ones have now been given some attention in Boysen v.
Boysen.6 There two persons were domiciled and were residents of Illinois.
They went into Indiana apparently with the sole intent of evading the
provisions of the Illinois Marriage Act and were married in compliance
with the laws of that state. In a suit to have the marriage annulled, it was
held that such relief should be denied.
The general rule undoubtedly is that a marriage valid or void by the
law of the state in which it is solemnized will be recognized as valid or
held void in every other jurisdictions, unless it is a polygamous or an in-
cestuous marriage prohibited by natural law, or otherwise declared void
license business since 1936, the last full calendar year prior to the effective date
of the hygienic marriage act." Statistics show the following number of licenses
issued:
1936 ......................................... 98,320
1937 ......................................... 76,496
1938 ......................................... 46,917
1939 ......................................... 51,181
The decrease was sharper down state. In Cook County Mr. Sidney Sunmerfield
of the marriage license bureau reports licenses issued:
1936 ......................................... 43,775
1937 ......................................... 39,617
1938 ......................................... 31,106
1939 ......................................... 35,113
In Rock Island County the licenses issued:
1938 ......................................... 1,696
1937 ......................................... 1,102
1938 ......................................... 312
1939 ......................................... 409
In Henry County the licenses issued:
1936 ......................................... 382
1937 ......................................... 348
1938 ......................................... 180
1939 ......................................... 170
In Whiteside County the licenses issued:
1936 ......................................... 558
1937 ......................................... 392
1938 ......................................... 125
1939 ......................................... 160
Chicago Tribune, 2/2/40-Vol. XCIC. No. 29, p. 8. An Indiana law, effective
March 1, 1940, will demand a blood test made by a state approved laboratory
before a license is granted.
6 301 Il. App. 573, 23 N.E. (2d) 231 (1939). See also, in support of this case,
Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920). Also involved was the
problem whether the equitable maxim that he who comes into equity should
come with clean hands should be applied. It was held that such maxim is not to
be invoked where its enforcement would result in sustaining an act declared
to be void or against public policy. See also Simmons v. Simmons, 19 F. (2d) 690
at 691 (1927); Snell v. Snell, 191 Ill. App. 239 (1915); Arado v. Arado, 281 Il. 123,
117 N.E. 816, 4 A.L.R. 28 (1917); Szlauzis v. Szlauzis, 255 Ill. 314, 319, 99 N.E.
640; but contra, see Berry v. Berry, 114 N.Y. S. 497 (1909), which is limited by
Brown v. Brown. 138 N.Y. S. 602 (1912).
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by positive law.7 Kent in his Commentaries 8 pointed out that there is an ex-
ception to this rule, that where two parties intending to evade the law of
the domicile go elsewhere and marry, the courts of the lex fori would not
be bound to hold the marriage valid, because it would be an act ad ever-
sionem juris nostri. In opposition to this opinion is the decision of the Court
of Delegates in England in 1768, involving a minor who ran away to Scot-
land without obtaining his guardian's consent as required by English law,
and there married, but the marriage was held valid by the English court. 9
An exceptional case is Cunningham v. Cunningham,10 in which a New
York court stressed the power of the domiciliary state over the citizen
and held that, in case the parties deliberately left the state to evade the
law of the domicile, the law of the lex fori should apply. But today the
courts generally hold that marriages valid where celebrated are valid
everywhere, subject to the two exceptions before mentioned: (1) where
the marriage violates natural law, and (2) where a marriage between
two parties is declared void in the state of domicile by a positive statute.
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act was promulgated to prevent per-
sons domiciled in one state from going into a sister state and marrying
wherever a local statute declares a marriage between such persons to be
absolutely void. Illinois enacted such a statute,1 but "the only marriages
which by that act are made null and void are marriages which are con-
tracted in a foreign state or country by residents of this state because
they are prohibited and declared void by the laws in this state."'1 2 The
Marriage Evasion Act was properly held to have no application in the
Boysen case to persons who leave Illinois to marry in order to evade the
statute requiring a pre-marital examination for venereal disease, since
marriage in violation thereof is not expressly declared void. 13
E. YOUNG
MINES AND MINERALS-NATURE OF ESTATE GRANTED-NATURE OF INTEREST
CREATED BY DEED CONVEYING OIL AND GAS UNDER LAND.-In Triger v. Carter
Coal Company,' the Supreme Court of Illinois, in construing the nature of
the estate of the grantee created by a mineral deed conveying the oil and
7 Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 54 S. Ct. 684, 78 L. Ed. 1219 (1934);
Wilson v. Cook, 256 Ill. 460, 100 N.E. 222 (1912); Reifschneider v. Reifschneider,
241 Ill. 92, 89 N.E. 255 (1909); State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561 at 563, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.)
800, 92 Pac. 417 (1907); Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18 (1881); Story, Conflicts
of Law (1846), 84; Rest. on Conflicts of Laws, § 115, 131,.and 132.
8 Vol. 2 (12th Ed.), pp. 92, 93.
9 Compton v. Bearcraft, 2 Hagg. Cons. 443, 444. This decision was gravely
questioned. Lord Mansfield a few years before had strongly intimated that he
was in favor of the other view, although he admitted the point was undecided in
England. Kent Commentaries, Vol. 2 (12th Ed.), 92, 93.
10 206 N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845 (1912).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 89, § 19.
12 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 236 Ill. App. 336 at 338 (1925).
13 The only legal consequences attached to a violation of this provision are a
fine on the the clerk issuing the license and either fine or imprisonment or both
on the person securing the same. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 89, § 6a. By contrast
see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 89, § 1, involving incestuous marriages.
1 372 Ill. 182, 23 N.E. (2d) 55 (1939).
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gas under a certain tract of land, decided that a freehold corporeal inter-
est in the land itself was the result. The court seemingly based its con-
clusion upon the fact that the deed also granted the right to the grantee to
enter upon the land for the purpose of prospecting and operating wells,
and expressly dismissed the theory that the title to the oil and gas in
place vests in the grantee2 by stating, "Oil and gas in place are minerals,
but by reason of their fugacious qualities they are incapable of an owner-
ship distinct from the soil. They belong to the owner of the land only so
long as they remain under the land, and if the owner makes a grant of
them to another, it is a grant only of the oil and gas that the grantee may
take from the land."
This decision is the leading case construing such a deed although the
principle followed has been heretofore laid down 8 in connection with the
nature of an estate created by an oil and gas lease.4 The ordinary oil and
gas lease contains the provision that the lessee is to have and to hold the
premises for a definite term and so long as oil and gas are produced there-
from in paying quantities. The courts of Illinois5 construe this provision
as creating a freehold estate in the land, inasmuch as the lease may last
for an indefinite time.
Although "it is no longer doubted that oil and gas within the ground
are minerals," 6 they have peculiar attributes not in common to other
minerals. They are fugitive in nature and have a vagrant habit and dis-
position to wander or percolate and possibly escape from beneath one
part of the surface of the earth to another. These tendencies have all
been taken into consideration by the courts in determining the nature of
2 The majority of courts follow the ownership theory. See Bodcaw Lumber Co.
v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S.W. 345 (1923); Moore v. Griffin, 72 Kan. 164, 83 P. 395
(1905); Wolfe County v. Beckett, 127 Ky. 252, 105 S.W. 447 (1907); Scott v. Laws,
185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W. 81 (1919); Weaver v. Richards, 156 Mich. 320, 120 N.W.
818 (1923); Hamilton v. Foster, 272 Pa. 95, 116 A. 50 (1922); Barnsdall v. Brad-
ford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 A. 207 (1909); Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43
S.W. 355 (1897); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915);
Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923);
Preston v. White, 57 W.Va. 278, 50 S.E. 236 (1905); Snodgrass v. Koen, 82 W.Va.
337, 96 S.E. 606 (1918).
3 Bruner v. Hicks, 230 Ill. 536, 82 N.E. 888 (1907); Watford Oil and Gas Co. v.
Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (1908); Poe v. Ulrey, 233 II. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908);
People ex rel. Carrell v. Bell, 237 Il. 332, 86 N.E. 593 (1908); Ohio Oil Co. v.
Daughetee, 240 Ill. 361, 88 N.E. 818 (1909); Illinois Kaolin Co. v. Goodman, 252
Ill. 99, 96 N.E. 867 (1911); Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N.E. 308
(1914); Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131 N.E. 645 (1921).
4 Although there are three principal types of oil and gas leases, the courts
of Illinois have not distinguished between them in applying their construction
of the nature of the lessee's estate in the oil and gas. Types of leases may: (1)
grant the exclusive right to explore for oil and gas. See Cortelyou v. Barnsdall,
236 Ill. 138, 86 N.E. 200 (1908). (2) grant the land for the sole purpose of searching
for oil. See Bruner v. Hicks, 230 Ill. 536, 82 N.E. 888 (1907); Watford Oil and Gas
Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (1908). (3) grant the oil and gas itself.
See Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908).
5 See note 3, supra.
6 Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
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the estate created by the conveyance or lease of oil and gas and have been
the basis for comparison with subterranean water 7 and even with animals
ferae naturae,8 resulting in the conclusion that oil and gas are not subject
to ownership except when reduced to actual possession by extraction
from the land.
Other courts have determined that these physical characteristics
create in the lessee or grantee an incorporeal hereditament in the nature
of a profit & prendre 9 or a mere license or right to explore for oil and gas.10
However, the majority of the courts," while taking into consideration
the physical nature of oil and gas, treat them much like coal and other
solid minerals. They hold that, while oil and gas is in place, it constitutes
a part of the realty and the landowner is regarded as having title thereto
in place. His title embraces necessarily the privilege or right to take them
from the ground. When nothing is said in the conveyance of the land, the
oil and gas passes with the surface. But the landowner may sever his
estate in the oil and gas from his estate in the surface by a grant of the oil
and gas or by an exception of the oil and gas in a conveyance of the sur-
face. The privilege or right to go upon the surface for the purpose of ex-
ploring and producing should be necessarily implied in a grant or excep-
tion of said oil and gas. 12 The possibility that the oil and gas may escape is
the basis for the theory that there can be no separate ownership of oil
and gas in place underneath the surface of the earth. The majority dis-
miss this argument by treating the conveyance as of no effect where oil
and gas are not beneath the land, which is similar to the treatment of a
conveyance of solid minerals where there are in fact no solid minerals
present beneath the land.18
Under this majority view, the estate created may be a fee simple, or
it may have a lesser duration, such as a determinable fee which results in
the lessee under an ordinary oil and gas lease in the ownership theory
state of Texas. 1
4
The remedy under the ownership theory to determine the title to the
oil and gas is logically trespass. 15 The equitable actions for protection
from actual or threatened injury generally accorded to the owner of real
estate would also be available.1 6
In Illinois, however, although "the owner of minerals [coal] may in-
7 People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59 (1892).
8 Westmoreland and Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724
(1889).
9 Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 P. 86 (1918).
10 Rechard v. Cowley, 202 Ala. 337, 80 So. 419 (1918); Thomas v. Standard De-
velopment Co., 70 Mont. 156, 224 P. 870 (1924).
11 See note 2, supra.
12 Weaver v. Richards, 156 Mich. 320, 120 N.W. 818 (1923).
13 Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
14 Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915); Stephens County v.
Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
15 Morrissey v. Amburgey, 292 S.W. 255 (Tex. Civ. App., 1927).
16 See A. W. Walker, Jr., "Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas,"
6 Tex. L. Rev. 125.
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voke the same remedies to assert or defend his rights and protect his title
as may the owner of a free estate in land generally, '17 the owner of the
oil and gas rights is not entitled to ejectment or other real action.1 8 His
remedy is in equity to prevent waste and irreparable injury.1 9
The result of the severance under the theory in Illinois and the own-
ership theory seem to have the same general effect upon litigants in that
the oil and gas both become personal property when reduced to possession
apart from the land. Also, both courts recognize the fact that a severance
takes place between the surface and oil and gas rights, which precludes
the adverse possessor of the surface from acquiring any rights to the oil
and gas after a conveyance or lease of the latter has taken place.20
V. KRAUCHUNAS
PARENT AND Cmi--AcTzoNs BETWEEN PARENT AND CmLD--RIGHT OF
AN UNEMANCIPATED MINOR TO RECOVER FROM PARENT UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH
STATUTE--The right of an unemancipated minor child to recover damages
for the wrongful death of one parent from the surviving parent was ques-
tioned in the Pennsylvania case of Minkin v. Minkin.1 As late as 1935 in
that state, tort liability of a parent to a child was denied because of public
policy, and the minor's sole remedy was declared to be the criminal prose-
cution of the parent, in the event of malice.2 The Minkin case, however, by
a four to three decision, sustained the minor's right to sue and rejected the
older public policy doctrine.3 The court based its decision primarily upon a
Pennsylvania statute of 1851, 4 amended in 1855,5 which provided in part
"that the persons entitled to recover damages for any injuries causing
death, shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased,
and no other relatives." The court pointed out that there was no exception
in the statute depriving the unemancipated minor of the right to sue
where the surviving parent was the tort feasor, and the court refused to
read such an exception into the act, despite the public policy against al-
lowing a child to sue his parent in tort.6
17 Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 176 IMI. 275, 52 N.E. 144 (1898).
Is Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Il. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (1908); Carter Oil
Co. v. Liggett, 371 Ill. 482, 21 N.E. (2d) 569 (1939).
19 Gillespie v. Fulton Oil and Gas Co., 236 Ill. 188, 86 N.E. 219 (1908); Ohio Oil
Co. v. Daughetee, 240 Il. 361, 88 N.E. 818 (1909); Carter Oil Co. v. Liggett, 371
Ill. 482, 21 N.E. (2d) 569 (1939).
20 Renfro v. Hanon, 297 IMI. 353, 130 N.E. 740 (1921).
1 Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49. 7 A. (2d) 461 (1939).
2 Briggs v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 50, 170 A. 871 (1934); Duffy v.
Duffy, 117 Pa. Super. 500, 178 A. 165 (1935).
3 See note 1, supra. 4 P. L. 669, par. 19; 12 P.S. par. 1601 (April 15, 1851).
5 P. L. 309, as amended, 12 P.S. par. 1602 (April 26, 1855).
6 The dissent expressed the opinion that the public policy which has denied
tort recovery in other cases since the passage of these Acts should be read into
the statute. A concurring opinion treated the infant's right as a property right
granted by statute, rather than a personal right of action, hence properly allowed
on the ground that it is familiar law that a child may sue the parent for wrongful
disposition of the child's property. Kreigh v. Cogswell, 45 Wyo. 531, 21 P. (2d)
831 (1933). Paskewie v. East St. L. & L. Ry. Co. 281 IMl. 385, 117 N.E. 1035, L.R.A.
1918 C 52 (1917).
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Notwithstanding a recently developed minority view,7 the great weight
of authority is still against the decision in the Minkin case,8 and even
those decisions in minority jurisdictions do not carry implications as far
reaching as those of the Pennsylvania decision. The seeds of a public
policy which permits tort actions between parent and child were planted
in a North Carolina dissenting opinion in 1923, 9 were carried into similar
dissents in Wisconsin in 192710 and in New York in 1928,11 and flowered in
1930 in the then revolutionary decision of Dunlop v. Dunlop.12 There a
New Hampshire court permitted a minor child to recover insurance com-
pensation as an insured servant of the father, and the child's disability to
sue was held not to prevent action where family harmony was not en-
dangered. Two years later, in Lusk v. Lusk,13 the Supreme Court of West
Virginia reached a similar conclusion in a case in which the parent's auto-
mobile liability insurance carrier was involved, holding "that when no
need exists for parental immunity, the courts should not extend it as a
mere gratuity." In the same year, the Appellate Court of Missouri permit-
ted a mother to sue her minor child in tort, the insurance factor having
been deemed material. 14 The state of Virginia was the last to join this
growing minority group, when it permitted the minor daughter of the
owner of a bus line to maintain an action against her father for injuries
sustained while a passenger in the father's bus.15 It appears that prior to
the instant case the minor's right of recovery was limited to situations in
which the parent's insurance carrier was the real defendant and situa-
tions where the child's injury was received when he was a servant or
passenger of the parent. None of these considerations were present in the
Minkin case, and hence it presents the first clear-cut rejection of the older
view, at least in wrongful death cases. 16
Historically there seems to be no basis for the rule forbidding a child
7 Dunlop v. Dunlop, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930); Lusk v.
Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W.
133 (1913).
8 See Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Foley v. Foley,
61 Ill. App. 577 (1895); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924);
Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175. 211 N.W. 88 (1926); 52 A.L.R. 1118; Taubert v.
Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199
N.W. 97, 33 A.L.R. 678 (1924); Mannion v. Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 A. 431
(1925).
9 Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12, 31 A.L.R. 1135 (1923).
10 Wick v. Wick, 192 Wi's. 260, 212 N.W. 787, 52 A.L.R. 1113 (1927).
11 Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 227 N.Y. S. 907, 162 N.E. 551 (1928).
12 Dunlop v. Dunlop, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930).
13 Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
14 Welles v. Welles, Mo. App., 48 S.W. (2d) 109 (1932). See also Dix v. Martin,
171 Mo. App. 266-274, 157 S.W. 133-136 (1913).
15 Worrell v. Worrell, Va. 4 S.E. (2d) 343 (1939).
16 The matter of damages was also determined; for by the statute in question,
the tort-feasor was also entitled to a portion of the recovery both as widow and
as successor to another, afterwards deceased, minor child. It was held that the
verdict, if favorable to the plaintiff, should exclude recovery to the widow who,
as tort-feasor, should receive nothing from her own wrong.
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to sue its parent for personal tort, and the common law recognized the
right of the child to bring an action for injury to property against the par-
ent.17 In this country, prior to 1891, suits between parent and child were
rare and were decided without much discussion of the ground of liabil-
ity.18 An early Louisiana case 19 established ground work for the nonlia-
bility rule by charging the parent with the duty of the child's training and
support and granting an incidental privilege to chastize subject to crim-
inal liability for abuse. The case, however, which is the first judicial prec-
edent for the nonliability rule is Hewlett v. George,20 where the action
was for the wrong of false imprisonment. It is significant that the de-
cision in the Hewlett case was put squarely on the ground that such suits
were prohibited by public policy, since this doctrine has been followed
and approved by the majority of the states. The rule as thus established
was adopted by many courts, some of which have added further reasons
for denying liability. Tennessee, 21 New Jersey,22 Maryland, 23 Minne-
sota,24 Georgia, 25 South Carolina, 26 North Carolina, 27 Ohio,28 and Rhode
Island29 all deny recovery as a matter of policy. Iowa,' 0 Michigan,Sl Cali-
fornia, s2 and Nebraska,3s in upholding the nonliability rule have added
the doctrine that a person precluded from recovery for personal injury,
since he and the tort feasor are members of a family group, cannot re-
cover from the employer of the tort feasor. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington' 4 denied civil recovery where the father had been convicted of the
rape of his daughter and sentenced to prison, the court basing its decision
on the policy of the preservation of domestic tranquility. Connecticut,
17 Faulk v. Faulk. 23 Texas 653 (1859); Keeney v. Henning, 58 N.J. Eq. 74, 42
A. 807; Fyffe v. Fyffe, 350 Ill. 620, 183 N.E. 641 (1932).
18 37 American Centennial Digest, Par. 140, Pp. 2241.
19 Bird v. Black, 5 La. Ann. 189 (1843).
20 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L.R.A. 682 (1891).
21 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664, 64 L.R.A. 991, 102 Am.
St. Rep. 787, 1 Ann. Cas. 130 (1903).
22 Mannion v. Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 A. 431 (1925); Damiano v. Damiano,
6 N.J. Misc. 49, 143 A. 3 (1928).
28 Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498, 71 A.L.R. 449 (1930).
24 Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Miller v. Pelzer,
159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97, 33 A.L.R. 678 (1924); Lund v. Olsen, 183 Minn. 515,
237 N.W. 188 (1931).
25 Bullock v. Bullock, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Chastain v. Chastain,
50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1935).
26 Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1931).
27 Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 17, 31 A.L.R. 1135 (1923).
28 Canen v. Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N.E. 277 (1931); Krohngold v. Krohn-
gold, 181 N.E. 910 (Ohio App., 1932).
29 Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198, 42 A.L.R. 1360 (1925).
80 Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924).
31 Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N.W. 290 (1927).
32 Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931); Ledgerwood v. Ledger-
wood, 114 Cal. App. 538, 300 P. 144 (1931).
83 Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927).
34 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788, 68 L.R.A. 893, 107 Am. St. Rep. 805,
2 Ann. Cas. 1 (1905).
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despite the fact that it permits tort actions between husband and wife, 5
adheres to the majority nonliability rule in regard to parent and child,
although it has been indicated that compulsory automobile insurance laws
might lead to a different rule.3 6 Indiana37 also follows the majority trend,
although one appellate court case permitted a father to recover in tort
against his minor child.38 Louisiana has specifically incorporated the non-
liability rule into the Code,3 9 however, a decision citing Dunlop v. Dun-
lop 40 with approval permitted minor children to recover statutory death
damages from their deceased father's estate for the death of their
mother.41
In Illinois, no case in point has ever been before the Supreme Court.
Two appellate court cases have approved the majority nonliability rule,
but both controversies were decided on different grounds. In Foley v.
Foley2 the prevailing rule is briefly stated without any consideration of
the grounds upon which it is supposed to rest, and in Meece v. Holland
Furnace Company,43 the action was dismissed on the ground that the
parent, in performing the acts which injured the minor child, was acting
outside the scope of his authority as agent of the defendant furnace com-
pany. The Illinois act 44 providing an action for wrongful death is almost
identical with that of Pennsylvania, including the lack of any exception
where the surviving parent is the tort feasor. The doctrine of the Minkin
case could be applied to our statute, if the courts of this state should de-
cide that a change in policy is warranted.
In denying actions between family members, the courts of New
York, 45 Wisconsin, 46 and Massachusetts, 47 following the parent and child
nonliability rule, have based their denial on the desirability of preserving
parental authority and domestic tranquility. Yet, in recent decisions, both
the New York 48 and Wisconsin49 courts have permitted suits between
children of the same family. Both cases discuss the effect of liability in-
35 Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 185, Ann. Cas. 1915
D 70 (1914).
36 Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929). The Connecticut court
in denying recovery says, "When compulsory insurance in Automobile cases is
required, and the legislative enactment provides that recovery can be had direct-
ly from an insurer by one injured through the negligence of the insured, the child
might recover of the insurer for the negligent injury inflicted by his parent."
87 Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924).
ss McKern v. Berk, 73 Ind. App. 92, 126 N.E. 641 (1920).
89 Section 104 of Louisiana Code of Practice.
40 Dunlop v. Dunlop, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930).
41 Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).
42 Foley v. Foley, 61 IMl. App. 577 (1895).
48 Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933).
44 II. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 70, §§ 1, 2.
45 Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 227 N.Y.S. 907, 162 N.E. 551 (1928); Ciani v. Ciani,
127 Misc. 304, 215 N.Y.S. 767 (1926).
46 Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787, 52 A.L.R. 1113 (1927).
47 Luster v. Luster, 13 N.E. (2d) 438 (Mass., 1938).
48 Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N.E. (2d) 254 (1939).
49 Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 229 Wis. 581,
281 N.W. 671 (1938).
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surance. In Rozell v. Rozell, 50 the New York court said: "Insurance as
protection to sufferers is a matter of common knowledge. But this fact
alone creates no right where one otherwise would not exist." If the pres-
ence of insurance is to materially affect this matter adequate legislation
should be provided, as has been done in Wisconsin, 51 for the joinder of the
parent's insurance carrier. Fictions could then be disregarded and the
child's right to sue the parent could be squarely placed on the ground
that no injury to the family could result. , 2  E. BoamM.
TRUSTS-EXPENSE OF ADMINISTRATION-WHETHER THE COST OF INVEST-
MENT COUNSEL Is AN EXPENSE PROPERLY CHARGEABLE TO TRUST ESTATE.-The
problem of whether or not a trustee may properly charge the trust estate
with the cost of the services of investment counsel is disposed of in sum-
mary fashion by the Surrogate's Court of New York in a single page opin-
ion handed down in the recent case of In re Gutman's Estate.' The court
apparently sees no reason for hesitating to hold that the trustee. may not
employ the services of investment counsel and expect the trust estate to
stand the expense, saying that it is "not willing to open the door to the
abuses which certainly would follow the establishment of the principle
that fiduciaries may engage the services of investment counsel at the cost
of the estate" and "if in his opinion a fiduciary is not competent to dis-
charge his duties properly he may always retire on application and
proper accounting."
No cases are cited in the opinion but seemingly the court feels that the
trustee is here seeking to delegate to an investment counsel an essential
function in the administration of the trust. If such was the intent of the
trustee and if such would be the effect of granting his request, then clearly
the court's decision is in line with authority, for it is established that a
trustee cannot properly employ an agent to select investments for the
trust.2 This view is in line with the general rule that the discretionary du-
ties of a trustee may not be delegated, a rule resting squarely on the theory
that his office is one of confidence, that he has been selected by the settlor
because of his personal fitness and qualifications, and that he should not
be permitted to avoid that responsibility by foisting on another the very
discretionary powers that he was chosen to perform.3 So the courts have
refused to permit trustees to delegate duties involving discretion although
50 Ibid.
51 Wisconsin Statutes-(Procedure in Civil Actions)--Chap. 260, Par. 260.11.
52 The validity of such a doctrine, i.e., that parent's liability is to depend upon
the presence or absence of insurance protection is one well open to question. See
Ill. Central R. Co. v. Hicklin, 131 Ky. 624, 115 S.W. 752, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 870 (1909).
1 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 473 (1939).
2 Scott, Trusts, II, 916; Restatement of Law of Trusts, § 171h. says, "A trustee
cannot properly delegate to another power to select investments." For cases, see
City of Boston v. Curley, 276 Mass. 549, 177 N.E. 557 (1931); In re Shintaffer's
Estate, 134 Kan. 101, 4 P. (2d) 764 (1931), holding an executor grossly negligent for
authorizing another person to invest and reinvest the estate's funds; Rowland v.
Witherden, 3 Mac. & G. 568, 42 Eng. Rep. 379 (1851); Bostock v. Floyer, L.R. I EQ.
26 (1865); Winthrop v. Attorney General, 128 Mass. 258 (1880).
5 Note, 50 A.L.R. 214.
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there has been no ban on the appointment of agents to perform purely
ministerial acts.
The well established policy of characterizing the act as either discre-
tionary or ministerial and thus determining whether or not it is a properly
delegable duty is bemoaned by some of the current writers on the subject.
Professor Bogert decries the arbitrary cleavage between acts involving
discretion and those merely ministerial, feeling that in so holding the
courts assume a simple and clean cut division whereas in reality the line
is difficult to draw with any degree of certainty. 4 Acts totally devoid of
discretion are few.
It would seem that the Surrogate's Court of New York, in considering
the petition of this trustee for permission to hire an investment counsel
should, instead of applying the discretionary-ministerial test, have fol-
lowed the more supportable approach to the problem and taken into con-
sideration the question of whether or not the cost of investment counsel
would be an expense that might reasonably be incurred by the trustee in
the administration of the estate. There was no need for the court to enter
into a discussion of the problem of delegation since it is fair to assume
here that the trustee sought to obtain advice and counsel to aid him in the
exercise of his discretion, not to delegate that discretion to another.5 The
only question the court was called upon to decide was whether or not the
expense involved was reasonably proper in the administration of the
estate.6 It has been said that "a trustee can properly incur expenses in
employing attorneys or brokers or other agents or servants so far as such
employment is reasonably necessary in the administration of the trust." 7
The test is whether or not the service was reasonably necessary, and, in
determining that, the court have been wont to apply (as in other trust
problems) the "reasonably prudent man in a similar situation" test.8
4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, III, 1766.
5 Restatement of Law of Trusts, § 171f. "Although a trustee cannot properly
delegate to another, he can properly consult with and take advice from others pro-
vided he personally makes the inal decision in the matter."
0 Cullinan v. Mercantile Trust Co. of California, 80 Cal. App. 377, 252 P. 647
(1927); Patterson v. Old Dominion Trust Co., 156 Va. 763, 159 S.E. 168 (1931), hold-
ing cost of legal advice allowable if reasonably necessary; Heard v. Eldrige, 109
Mass. 258, 12 Am. Rep. 687 (1872), stockbroker expense; Auxier v. Aetna Insurance
Co., 222 Ky. 243, 300 S.W. 616 (1927), agent to sell land; In re Van Riper's Estate,
90 N.J. Eq. 217, 107 A. 55 (1919), agent to sell land and collect rent; Hagedorn v.
Arens, 106 N.J. Eq. 377, 150 A. 4 (1930), accountant where accounts were com-
plicated; Wilder v. Hast, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1181, 96 S.W. 1106 (1906), bookkeeper; City
of St. Louis v. McAllister, 302 Mo. 152, 257 S.W. 425 (1923); Wemme v. First Church
of Christ, Scientist, of Portland, 110 Ore. 179, 219 P. 618 (1923); Kerner v. Peterson,
368 Ill. 59, 12 N.E. (2d) 884 (1938); Johnston v. Rothwell, 87 P. (2d) 13 (Wyo., 1939);
Sorrels v. McNally, 94 Fla. 1237, 115 So. 540 (1927); Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co.
v. Pittsburgh United Corporation, 334 Pa. 107, 5 A. (2d) 890 (1939) ; Warner v. Rogers,
255 Ill. App. 78 (1929); Gisborn v. Charter Oak Life Insurance Co. 142 U.S. 326, 35
L. Ed. 1029 (1892); City of Bangor v. Peirce, 106 Me. 527, 76 A. 945, 138 Am. St.
Rep. 363, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 770 (1910).
7 Scott, Trusts, II, 1004.
8 "Prudent man in his own affairs" test applied by the court in Halstead's Ex'rs
v. Ingram, 163 Va. 223, 175 S.E. 898 (1934), using this language: "Nothing more is
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Says Professor Bogert, "If the business man would employ an outside ex-
pert, or use a regularly employed agent or servant, then the trustee is
given similar liberty." ,9
Applying the prudent man test to the instant case, particularly in the
light of common business usage, could not the court, without doing vio-
lence to rational thought or to the precedent of trust law, have deemed
this to be an allowable expense? Though no identical factual situation has
been considered by the higher courts, analogous problems would indicate
that the trustee's petition here should have been allowed. Courts have
consistently allowed reasonable attorney fees as a charge against the
trust estate where the litigation involved or legal advice sought was rea-
sonably necessary to the preservation and protection of the estate.10
There are also cases permitting a trustee to hire the services of account-
ants and charge the estate with the expense where the accounts involved
are so complicated as to make the services of an accounting firm a proper
expense in the administration of the estate." So also have trustees been
permitted to hire, at the expense of the trust estate, realty brokers to lo-
cate possible purchasers of trust property,12 stock brokers for the same
purpose, 13 construction experts when the trust involved constructing a
large office building, 14 and other agents to aid the trustee in his adminis-
tration of the estate. Of course, the facts and necessities of each case
must be weighed by the court, in light of established trust tenets, before
the particular expense item submitted for approval is allowed. In one
case the court, in applying the prudent man test, might lay particular
emphasis on the size of the trust estate, whereas in another the controll-
ing factor might well be the individual or corporate character of the
trustee.15
required of a trustee than that he should act in good faith and with the same
prudence and discretion that a prudent man exercises in his own affairs."
9 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, III, 1766. And 65 C.J. 666 embodies the same
thought in saying that "in a number of cases the employment of agents has been
upheld chiefly upon the ground that such employment arose through necessity or
was justified by the common usages of business," citing several cases.
10 Conley v. Waite, 134 Cal. App. 505, 25 P. (2d) 496 (1933); Smith v. Massachu-
setts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 390, 156 So. 498, 95 A.L.R. 508 (1934); Union
Bank of Chicago v. Wormser, 256 Ill. App. 291 (1930); Chiles v. Robinson, 224 Ky.
71, 5 S.W. (2d) 269 (1928); In re Rothwell's Estate, 283 Mass. 563, 186 N.E. 662
(1933); In re Leupp, 108 N.J. Eq. 49, 153 A. 842 (1931); Ellis v. Kelsey, 241 N.Y. 374,
150 N.E. 148 (1925); In re Pollock's Will, 236 N.Y.S. 149 (1929); Stahl v. Stahl, 166
Ill. App. 236 (1911); In re Howell's Will, 204 N.C. 437, 168 S.E. 671 (1933).
11 Hagedorn v. Arens, 106 N. J. Eq. 377, 150 A. 4 (1930); Scott, Trusts, II, 1005.
12 Auxier v. Aetna Insurance Co., 222 Ky. 243, 300 S.W. 616 (1927); In re Van
Riper's Estate, 90 N. J. Eq. 217, 107 A. 55 (1919).
13 Heard v. Eldridge, 109 Mass. 258, 12 Am. Rep. 687 (1872).
14 Ewing v. Foley, 115 Texas 222, 280 S.W. 499, 44 A.L.R. 627 (1926).
'5 A case shedding an interesting sidelight on the instant case is that of In re
Schinasi's Estate, 294 N.Y.S. 400 (1936), where the court disallowed a claim of
$5,000 to cover the salary expense of two hotel experts who had conducted a sur-
vey of the problems of hotel management, rehabilitation etc., for the corporate
trustee involved. The court there said that a corporate trustee is presumably
equipped to handle difficult problems, that it holds itself out as having facilities not
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In any event, it would seem that where a trustee can show that the best
interests of the trust estate will be served by his employing investment
counsel to aid him in his selection of investments so that the estate may
be properly administered and preserved, he should be allowed to pay a
reasonable fee for such services and charge the estate accordingly. If,
instead, the courts are going to impose on the trustee the burden of devot-
ing individual and personal attention to each and every investment trans-
action without permitting him to lean on assistants for technical and pro-
fessional help as would a reasonably prudent business man in a similar
situation, then they are employing a short-sighted policy of trust adminis-
tration such as will inevitably work a serious hardship on the entire field
of trusts. Responsible men will shun trust appointments if they are not
permitted the use of assistants as sanctioned by common business
usage.16  J. C. BERCHOFF
TRUSTS - SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS - WHETHER INTEREST OF DEFAULTING
TRusTEE-BENEFIcIAY CAN BE RFACsD BY SuRETY-AssGNEE OF CLAIM OF
TRUST ESTATE.-In the Massachusetts case of Blakemore v. Jones,' Janet
H. Jones, one of two trustees, being also a beneficiary, was charged for
losses suffered by the trust estate as a result of the bad judgment of the
co-trustee, now deceased. Her surety paid $32,000 to the succeeding
trustee, receiving a release and an assignment of the claim of the trust
estate against Janet H. Jones, including any right to reach her interest as
beneficiary. The trust deed contained a typical spendthrift trust provision. 2
The surety made demand on the trustee for all income due and to become
due the defaulting trustee-beneficiary under the trust. Miss Jones was
without other means of support. The trustee petitioned for instructions.
The Massachusetts court rejected the rule of the Restatement of the
Law of Trusts, which declares that the beneficiaries of a spendthrift trust
available to individuals and that it is thus bound, when the need arises, to draw
upon its own personnel at no additional expense to the trust estate. The inference
of the opinion is that the right of the individual trustee to employ expert assistants
is broader and freer than that enjoyed by the corporate trustee. In the instant
case we have as trustee the widow and brother of the deceased settlor, individuals
chosen primarily because of love and affection, secondarily perhaps because of
sound business ability and honesty, but certainly not because of any holding out of
special ability in the field of investments.
16 By way of appendage it should be noted that although the court's entire
opinion is concerned with delegation of discretion, and this comment has neces-
sarily discussed the opinion as written, the attorney's record does show that the
court made an observation during the course of the argument to the effect that the
income of the estate had thus far been very satisfactory and that therefore there
appeared to be no necessity for employment of investment counsel. Perhaps the
court was thinking in terms of necessary expense rather than of delegable powers,
but the language of the opinion certainly belies such a possibility.
1 22 N.E. (2d) 112 (Mass., 1939).
2 "All payments both principal and income made under the provisions of this
will shall be made directly to the several beneficiaries named on his or her per-
sonal receipt only or applied to his or her benefit without power of anticipation or
assignment and without liability for his or her debts or obligations."
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are entitled to a charge on the interest of a defaulting trustee-beneficiary,
saying, "The quoted statement of principle, we think, has application only
where the interest of trustee as beneficiary is in its nature liable to be
reached by creditors!" The court holds that the trust estate is only a
creditor, though perhaps a secured one, and as a creditor cannot reach
the income, so that the trust estate is without power to withhold it from
the beneficiary.
The court claimed to be following a previous decision by the same
court in "resisting encroachments" on the spendthrift trust doctrine,
citing Bucknam v. Bucknam,4 in support. Comparison shows that the
court in the instant case has gone to much greater lengths to uphold the
spendthrift provision. The court in the Bucknam case, while deciding that
a divorced wife with dependent child could not reach the beneficiary's in-
terest in an action to apply it to a judgment debt or to enforce her rights as
assignee, specifically refused to decide the question of whether recovery
might be had on the theory that the settlor intended to support his son's
family as well as the son. The court there cited Eaton v. Eaton,5 where
recovery was allowed on the presumption that the settlor intended by use
of the word "support" to include the means for supporting the son's fam-
ily as well as himself, indicating that on a proper showing this presump-
tion would be followed.
Some support for the instant decision may be found in Overman's
Appeal,6 which decided that the interest of a defaulting trustee-beneficiary
could not be withheld from him although his account had been sur-
charged for mismanagement. Here the court refused to vary from the
"expressed intent" of the settlor, but as an exculpatory clause was in-
cluded in the provisions of the trust deed, there were much stronger
grounds there for finding that such an intent existed.
The result in the instant case is founded on the court's construction of
the will to the effect that the settlor has manifested an intention to pro-
vide for the support of the trustee-beneficiary regardless of any equity
which might be created in favor of the other beneficiaries to have resti-
tution. To reach this result the court has to say that the other beneficiaries
have only a creditor's claim and not an equitable charge as the Re-
statement indicates. It is in effect saying that the written provisions of
the settlor must be given this chosen effect regardless of the fact that the
provisions are inconclusive, although the result disregards the equity of
the other beneficiaries and tends to encourage careless trust administra-
8 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 257: "If a trustee who is also one of the
beneficiaries commits a breach of trust, the other beneficiaries are entitled to a
charge upon his beneficial interest to secure their claims against him for the
breach of trust." Comment f: "Rule stated in this section is applicable though
the interest of the trustee beneficiary is not transferable by him or subject to the
claims of his creditors. Although his ordinary creditors cannot reach his interest
• . . other beneficiaries can."
4 200 N.E. 918, 104 A.L.R. 774 (Mass., 1936).
5 81 N.H. 265, 125 A. 433, 35 A.L.R. 1034 (1924), 82 N. H. 216, 132 A. 10 (1926).
6 88 Pa. 276 (1879).
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tion by trustee-beneficiaries. Other authorities join the Restatement in
disagreeing with such a holding.7
The Illinois courts have not yet been faced with the case of the de-
faulting trustee-beneficiary, but decisions in spendthrift trust cases show
a tendency to allow "encroachments" in the spendthrift trust doctrine.
The Illinois Appellate Court has held that the income from a spendthrift
trust may be reached by a divorced wife in a suit to enforce payment of
alimony8 and that fees and costs incurred by an attorney in establishing
a beneficiary's interest are payable out of his interest.9 In these decisions,
the Illinois court has shown an unwillingness to be bound by a narrow in-
terpretation of the settlor's intent, instead broadening the meaning of the
term "support" to include these items. These decisions have also drawn
support from the usual public policy considerations pertaining to spend-
thrift trusts-an unwillingness to allow the inalienability feature to create
public burdens-and from the realistic view that the settlor's intent is a
true test only where an intent is indicated, ordinary equitable and legal
principles dictating the construction in other cases.
To include the case of the defaulting trustee-beneficiary in the class
of "encroachments" on the spendthrift trust doctrine does not require the
finding of a "presumed intent" nor does it require the overriding of an
express intent. It requires only that the spendthrift provision be limited
to its natural intendment-that the benefits accruing to the cestuis shall
not be available to creditors nor to the cestuis by anticipation. It is more
reasonable and certainly more equitable to limit the effect of the spend-
thrift provision to this than to say that the spendthrift provision plus the
fact that this beneficiary is made trustee is tantamount to an exculpatory
clause.
7 See Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts (Matthew Bender & Co., 1936), §1 350: "The
trustee of a spendthrift trust may withhold the income due a beneficiary who was
also a co-trustee to make good breaches of trust committed by the beneficiary
when he was a co-trustee." Scott, Trusts, II, § 257.1: "The interest of a beneficiary
may be inalienable, either by the terms of the trust or by statute, although the
beneficiary is also a trustee. Although the interest of the trustee-beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust cannot be reached by his creditors, it can be impounded for the
benefit of the other beneficiaries to make good a breach of trust committed by
him."
Cited by both authorities is the leading case of In re Burr's Estate, 257 N.Y.S.
654 (1932), in which the New York court held that a trustee's claim to the interest
of a defaulting trustee-beneficiary was valid and was superior to the claim of the
trustee-beneficiary's wife's claim to alimony, no intent to the contrary having been
shown. The court there called up the "established rule of equity that the rights of
a beneficiary of an estate to restitution, as against a defaulting trustee, are supe-
rior to those of the trustee in his capacity as life tenant, or as owner of an out-
right share of the estate, or as against his assignees or creditors." The court
construed the New York statute (Personal Prop. Law, § 15, as amended by laws
1911, c.327) against alienability of such interests as not applicable in such cases,
since otherwise great inequity would be done.
8 England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922); Tuttle v. Gunderson, 254 Ill. App.
552 (1929); Keller v. Keller, 284 Ill. App. 198 (1936), noted in 14 CHICAGO-KENT
Rsvssw 276, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 30 Ill. L. Rev. 1067.
9 Judson v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 238 Ill. App. 531 (1925).
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Where, then, there is no expression of intent by the settlor as to the
rights of the trustee-beneficiary when he is in default, ordinary rules of
equity will take hold. It is well known that equity requires of a trustee the
strictest performance of his duty before it will support his beneficial in-
terest against those otherwise prejudiced by his conduct as trustee. In an
ordinary trust, the trustee has no right to his compensation or his benefits
as cestui until his account has been accepted.10 It is plain that equity
should reject an interpretation which clearly encourages laxity and even
intentional wrongdoing by trustees. Especially is this true in light of the
equitable doctrine which requires a showing of well defined intention by
the settlor to support a spendthrift trust in any case, on the ground that
making property inalienable and limiting the rights of creditors is not in
accord with the best interests of the public.1'
In the instant case the court was influenced, as the language of the
decision shows, by the fact that the defaulting trustee-beneficiary was a
nominal trustee only, her wrong being one of omission rather than of
commission. In allowing this fact to influence the decision, however, the
court has allowed a hard case to establish a dangerous precedent.
D. G. MA DONALD
10 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 192: "A cestul who is also a trustee of the same
trust holds his interest under it subject to an equity that sums lost to the trust by
reason of his defaults shall be deducted from his share before any payment is
made to him out of trust funds. His interest under the trust is incumbered with
an existing equity to make up actual past defaults, and with a potential or possible
equity to restore money lost or stolen in the future."
11 See Erwin N. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts, 243, adding other grounds.
